one of the objectives is pursued. In the face of changing market prices of outputs and inputs and policy environment the cooperatives that can adapt all the three objectives synergestically are able to serve their members better than those whose efforts are concentrated in supplying liquid milk to urban centres.
SAMPLE AND DATA
Data were collected at the union, village, and farmer-member levels. Data at the union level were collected from annual reports and other records; the period covered was up to 1980-81. Field data were collected for 1981-82. The three selected Gujarat unions were: Sabarkantha District Cooperative Milk Producers' Union Limited, Himmatnagar (Sabar); the Mehasana District Cooperative Milk Producers' Union Limited, Mehsana (Dudhsagar); and the Surat District Cooperative Milk Producers' Union Limited, Surat (Sumul). The three unions in Maharashtra were: Shree Warana Cooperative Milk Producers' and Processors' Union Limited, Amrit Nagar, Kolhapur district; Krishna Khore Milk Producers' Cooperative Union Limited, Miraj, Sangli district; and Shree Hanuman Milk Producers' Cooperative Union, Yelguda, Kolhapur district.
Five villages along the major milk collection routes of each union were selected. The villages chosen were those which had the highest average milk supply per member for the year 1980-81. In each village between 15 and 17 members were selected at random In all, 506 member-households were contacted in the-30 villages. Data were obtained by a questionnaire-cum-interview method on quantity and cost of each item that went into the production of milk, including interest cost on borrowings. A return of 16 per cent per annum on the farmers' own investments in milch animals and working capital was included. The value of family labour and fodder not bought in the market were added to the cost figures provided by the members to arrive at the total cost of production. The period covered was July 1981 to June 1982. Table 1 provides data on the six unions and the number of members interviewed.
Profile of unions
Gujarat unions had evolved from village milk cooperative societies and had specialized in dairy as an industry. They had milk processing plants, cattle feed plants, and provided inputs including veterinary facilities to their members. They supplied about 50 per cent of their liquid milk collection to Bombay and Delhi government milk schemes. They retained considerable autonomy in decisions on price, product mix, and marketing.
Dairy development in Maharashtra had not reached the level achieved in Gujarat. The three Maharashtra unions were established as a part of the development programmes of the sugar cooperatives. Milk was collected by the village cooperatives which were engaged in distribution of credit and other agri-inputs (multipurpose societies).
All three Maharashtra unions were established primarily to serve as feeder units to Bombay. None of them had a fully integrated dairy. They had no freedom to manufacture products, to fix the price, or choose the buyer for liquid milk. These decisions were taken by the Milk Commissioner, Government of Maharashtra. None of the Maharashtra unions had a cattle feed plant. Nor did they provide extensive veterinary services.
Gujarat had only one union per district, while in Maharashtra there were more than one. All the three Gujarat unions procured milk entirely through village-level cooperative societies. These villagelevel societies were dominant in the village milk economies. The Shree Hanuman procured directly from the village producers. The Shree Warana and Krishna Khore unions procured through multi-purpose cooperative societies. Only Warana union did milk processing to a small extent, while Krishna Khore and Shree Hanuman unions did not process milk.
The extent of integration and producers' cooperative linkage constituted, therefore, a major difference between the Maharashtra and Gujarat unions. How did these differences affect the service they rendered to their members?
Indices of service
It is difficult to compare the services rendered by the Gujarat and Maharashtra unions because the breed quality of cattle and conditions for milk production are different in the two sets of unions. Yet, an index that measures the extent of service provided to members has to be devised. There are no commonly accepted measures.
One index of service to members could be the percentage of the sales realization passed on to members. This is arrived at by deducting the costs of processing and cooperative administration from sales realization and expressing the balance that accrues to the member as a percentage of the price per litre of liquid milk.
This index has two problems. Firstly, the index can be useful only when unions are engaged in comparable activities under similar conditions of procurement, processing, and marketing. These conditions in Gujarat and Maharashtra are not comparable as has already been described. Alternatively, norms or standards have to be established for different tasks, such as transport cost per kilometre, or total procurement costs after taking into account the differences. A systematic and continuing inquiry of producers' costs is not carried out by the unions. A methodology of accurately assessing various costs is yet to be established at the state as well as the national level. In the absence of such norms, the index can only give a rough idea of the magnitude of the differences and indicate the areas for further examination.
Secondly, the percentage of sales realization passed on to members does not show the extent to which the union has been able to develop and exploit all available market opportunities.
The proportion of cost reimbursed by the union of its members could, therefore, be considered another important index of service. These two indices-the percentage of sales realization passed on to members and the proportion of members' costs reimbursed-can together provide an indication of the extent to which members' interests are served by milk cooperatives.
FINDINGS

Producers' share in sales realization
The prices in Maharashtra are fixed by the Milk Commissioner, Government of Maharashtra, while the Gujarat unions have a degree of autonomy in fixing prices.
The Maharashtra Government price structure requires the Maharashtra unions to pass on 78 per cent of the sales realization to the producer. In actual practice, however, the unions and the producers were not able to realize in full the prices fixed by the Government. Against the officially stipulated price of Rs. 383 per 100 litres, Shree Warana realized only Rs. 319, while the Krishna Khore realized only Rs. 255. Therefore, the actual amount passed on to the producers as percentage of sales realization was much less than the amount expected statutorily. Even so, the Maharashtra unions passed on to their members a larger percentage of their sales realization than did the three Gujarat unions. Krishna Khore passed on the highest, 86 per cent, compared to 49 per cent of the Surat district union. Table 2 gives the details of costs and margins at various stages from producers to consumers. The share of producers in the sales rupee is given in the Summary As can be seen from the figures given above and in Table 2 , there are wide variations among the three unions in Gujarat, and between them and the Maharashtra unions. One reason for the variations on this measure among the three unions in Gujarat was the considerable variations in their procurement costs: Rs. 181 per 100 litres for Surat, Rs. 45 for Mehasana, Rs. 2 for Sabarkantha. The Surat district union incurred a high collection cost because it was obliged to meet the objective, set-up by the statewide cooperative system, of providing an assured outlet for the entire quantity of milk brought in by its members. One of the slogans of the Gujarat cooperatives is to "buy every once of milk our members bring to their coops." The cooperatives in Maharashtra have no such commitment.
Partly because of this commitment and partly in response tomarket opportunities, the Gujarat unions had borrowed money to invest in processing and value addition activities on behalf of their members. The equity to debt ratio ranged from 1.21 to 1.94 in the Gujarat unions, while it was 0.37 in the case of Shree Warana and 9.65 in the case of Krishna Khore (Table 3) . The Shree Warana's low figure of 0.37 was mainly due to losses incurred in three successive years from 1977-78 to 1979-80.
The Maharashtra unions had not used their debt capacity fully nor did they undertake significant value addition activities. They operated on prices and margins fixed by the Milk Commissioner, Government' of Maharashtra. They actually worked on margins smaller than those officially provided and had not fully exploited all market opportunities.
The higher percentage of sales rupee passed on to the producer by the Maharashtra unions did not mean that the unions were in a strong financial position. The Shree Warana union had losses of Rs.3.59 per 100 litres in 1977 -78, Rs.5.99 in 1978 -79, and Rs. 4.34 in 1979 . The Krishna Khore had marginal profits, but this was possible only because it paid less to its members than Shree Warana. The Maharashtra unions did not have a sound financial base and, therefore, could not pursue their members' interests. Table 3 shows the comparative financial position of the unions in Gujarat and Maharashtra. The Gujarat unions had increased their members' capital funds substantially between 1976-77 and 1980-81: Mehasana, 41 per cent; Sabarkantha, 217 per cent } and Surat, 124 per cent. The Shree Warana had barely managed to retain the level of members' equity over the period while Krishna Khore had augmented its members' equity only by 25 percent.
There were wide differences even among the Gujarat unions on this index. Even though Sabarkantha and Mehasana district unions were engaged in similar value addition activities, Sabarkantha passed on 72 per cent of the sales rupee to its members while Mehasana could pass only 55 per cent. While the better performance of Sabarkantha union could be due to its lower procurement costs, persistence of such differences over several years should have led the Mehasana union to examine its costs and activities so that a higher percentage of sales rupee may be passed on to the producer.
Percentage of costs reimbursed
The Gujarat unions did much better than the Maharashtra ones on the second index of service. They reimbursed to their members nearly three-fourths of their total costs, whereas the Maharashtra unions could reimburse only about half their members' costs. Table 4 provides the 1981-82 data on the extent of reimbursement of members' costs in Gujarat and Maharashtra. Except for large suppliers in Gujarat, members belonging to no other category had their costs fully reimbursed.
The Gujarat unions served their members better than did Maharashtra unions not only in reimbursing a greater proportion of their members' costs but also in achieving a lower cost of production. The price and market environments have not been fundamentally different for the unions in the two states. Yet the Gujarat unions did better. Why?
Milk Producers
The bargaining power of individual milk producers is low. They are scattered, small, and weak. Liquid milk is a perishable and seasonal commodity, and its transportation and bulk handling are complex tasks. Small, individual producers are in no position to pursue efficiently other alternatives; they have to sell liquid milk. Their only hope is a cooperative union which unites small producers to develop and exploit better alternatives.
Most milk producers owned no land or were small or marginal farmers. It was found that 17 per cent of milk suppliers in Gujarat and 10 per cent of milk suppliers in Maharashtra owned no land. Small and marginal farmers (they are categorized according to the official definition) constituted 61 per cent of all suppliers in Maharashtra and 39 per cent in Gujarat. Small suppliers (supplying less than 5 litres per day) accounted for 38 per cent of suppliers in Gujarat and 52 per cent in Maharashtra. An average small supplier in the villages selected in Gujarat produced 1,545 litres between July 1981 and June 1982 and sold three-quarters to the society and consumed the rest. The small supplier in the selected Maharashtra villages produced much less milk, only 1,052 litres, but also sold less, two-thirds of production. The actual quantity retained for consumption was roughly the same in both Gujarat and Maharashtra.
The medium suppliers, along with the small suppliers, constituted 70 per cent of the suppliers in the villages selected in both the states. They accounted for 50 per cent of all milk collected by the Gujarat unions and 60 per cent by the Maharashtra unions in their respective villages.
Vikalpa
Union's role
The role of producers' unions lies in aggregating and articulating the interests of widely scattered small producers. A union can manage the produce and production process more efficiently than individual or groups of small producers can do by themselves. The issues involved are complex. The economies of the district, state, or urban centres may not be able to absorb all the milk produced. The low level of management, inadequate investment resources, shortage of green fodder, and low productivity of the dairy farmers pose difficult problems for dairy managers and policy makers. Obtaining higher prices, therefore, cannot be the only way to serve producers' interests as the unions that supply most of their liquid milk to government dairies in urban centres appear to think. Members' interests are best served if unions gain some autonomy from the vagaries of governmental decision-making processes and ensure participation in the politico-bureaucratic processes of decision making. The superior performance of the Gujarat unions can be explained in terms of a more effective cooperative structure which enables the producers to participate in the decision making at all levels, specialization and integration in operations, and a more economic size of the union.
Cooperative structure
The primary village societies in Gujarat were specialized milk cooperatives dedicated to the interests of producers. They were engaged in milk collection and distribution of cattle feed. The village societies kept accounts, paid according to milk quality, and helped standardize practices. The price of milk was based on fat content. Each village cooperative society was part of a statewide cooperative structure and controlled its own activities through its elected members. Village societies had formed a district-level union. Societies had representation on the boards of directors of the district union of cooperatives. The various district level unions had federated themselves into a state-level apex federation, and the chairmen of the district unions were directors on the board of the federation.
The objectives of the federation were to market the products of member unions, ensure an assured outlet for milk and a fair return to producers, and an adequate return to the member-unions through development of their processing and product manufacturing facilities. The federation's marketing policies were of prime concern to unions. The unions were subject to the norms and standards established by the federation. A programme committee of the federation determined the member-union's product mix, and thus their capacity utilization, and prices as well as inter-district and interstate movements. The products of the unions were subject to quality control standards and the federation's marketing and distribution requirements. The federation received a mark-up and small cess on the quantity of milk procured by the unions. The federation had to lift all milk supplies of its' member-unions. It promoted inter-union cooperation rather than competition and acted as a centralized purchase division (for items such as cartons, tins, chemicals, and vitamins) for its member-unions. Coordinating the unions and the federation objectives was a difficult task. Dairying and cooperation being state subjects, the state government had considerable control and influence over the cooperative system. The Gujarat federation and its unions had acquired a degree of autonomy from the govern ment. The cooperative structure had evolved in Gujarat to a sophisticated level enabling it to handle complex issues while pursuing producers' interests at the village, district, and state levels. ' In contrast, the Krishna Khore and the Shree Hanuman unions in Maharashtra were primarily engaged in collecting milk. They did not have processing facilities. They supplied milk to the processing plants of Miraj or Kolhapur unions as per the directives of the Maharashtra Government's Milk Commissioner. The Miraj arid Kolhapur unions, in turn, acted as feeder units to government dairies in the Bombay milk supply scheme. The Milk Commissioner fixed margins for the unions and prices to be paid to the producers. The Shree Warana Union supplied 90 per cent of the milk it collected from adjoining areas to the Kolhapur district union. It converted the remaining quantity into milk products such as peda, shrikhand, and gulab jamun for local sale. It had not developed a marketing system of its own, nor had it linked up with the marketing and distribution network of other unions for selling its products.
Specialization
The three Maharashtra unions were established by the sugar cooperatives. There were no primary village cooperative societies in the five Shree Hanuman union villages included in the study. The union directly collected milk from the member-producers. Krishna Khore and Shree Warana collected milk through multipurpose village societies involved in credit and other input activities. Unlike in Gujarat, the village societies in Maharashtra were not paying their members according to the quality of milk they supplied. In fact, in 1981-82, the Maharashtra milk system did not have a pricing system based on fat content.
Sixty-three per cent of milk suppliers in Maharashtra were members of other cooperatives, while the corresponding figure for Gujarat was only 10 per cent. Dairying was the primary occupation for 30 per cent of small milk suppliers in Gujarat, while it was so for only 3 per cent in Maharashtra. Milk production and related activities were submerged in the larger activities of sugar cooperatives and village multipurpose societies in Maharashtra, while Gujarat had developed a specialized and professionally managed cooperative structure exclusively for milk producers.
Integration
The Gujarat unions had integrated backwards into provision of cattlefeed, lucern seeds for fodder production,-and veterinary and artificial insemination services. They owned cattlefeed plants and distributed large quantities of cattlefeed through their network of village cooperative societies. Of the three Maharashtra unions, only Shree Warana union bought and distributed cattlefeed.
The Gujarat unions had also done forward integration-processing liquid milk and production and marketing of various milk-based products. The Mehasana and Sabarkantha district unions converted more than 50 per cent of the milk they collected in 1980-81 into various products-baby foods, ghee, butter, and whole and skimmed milk powder. They marketed their products through the channels available in the state cooperative structure.
Economic size
The three Gujarat unions covered about 600 to 1,000 village cooperative societies in the entire district, three to five times the number of villages covered by Maharashtra unions. While in Maharashtra a district had more than one union, the Gujarat structure provided for only one districtwide union. This gave them scope for larger operations. The Mehasana district union procured in 1980-81, through its 852 village cooperative societies, nearly 4,00,000 litres of milk per day, hundred times that of Shree Hanu-man union in Maharashtra and nearly eight times that of Shree Warana and Krishna Khore unions.
SUMMING UP
It is clear from the study that a union of small producers who are scattered cannot serve its members effectively if it merely acts as a supply union for urban government dairies. It has to pursue its members' interests with single-minded devotion. The nature of dairy industry has led the Gujarat producers to develop a cooperative structure, reflecting producers' interests in decisions at village, district, and state levels while pursuing the interests of their members. The structure has enabled them to specialize, achieve economic size, and integrate production and distribution of inputs and processing and marketing of milk and milk-based products. This has yielded them better returns and helped them lower costs.
As a result, the cost of milk production of members in Gujarat was Rs. 4.35 per litre, 19 per cent less than the Rs. 5.39 in Maharashtra. The cost in Gujarat was lower in all categories of suppliers-small, medium, and large. The difference in the cost of production between Maharashtra and Gujarat producers cannot be attributed solely to the cooperative structure. Even so, the activities of the unions in Gujarat provide a direction of effort, an assurance to small producers, and good prospects of long-term survival.
The cooperative structure in Gujarat has enabled more landless to take up milk production. It has made possible greater household investments in milch animals and higher milk production (Table 5} . A small supplier in Gujarat produced 1,545 litres, 47 per cent more than a small supplier in Maharashtra. The medium and large suppliers in Maharashtra produced slightly more than did their counterparts in Gujarat, but they produced mostly cow milk which is lower in fat content (Table 5 ). The higher proportion of cow milk also increased the cost of fodder for the Maharashtra milk producers which was left uncompensated by the pricing system.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The implications for the unions are clear:
• reflect producers' interests in a state wide cooperative structure, with decision making in the interests of all produc ers, especially small producers • specialize, achieve economic size, • pursue integrated activities • monitor producers' costs and maximize their returns. For government policy makers, the implication is that they should not get directly involved in price fixation or output management. They have to balance the interests of consumers and producers. One way to do this would be to put the urban milk dairies into the cooperative framework instead of owning and managing them on behalf of urban consumers.
The public policy makers should support the autonomous development of producers' cooperative organizations into a large, integrated, and stable network with a diversity of products and service activities. The current pricing system that reimburses only about half the total costs of small and medium producers should be a matter of concern to policy makers. Producers' unions, dairy experts, and consumer interest groups should jointly establish an accepted methodology for determining costs and entrust an institute with the task of conducting periodic studies to develop a reliable time series of cost data. They should also establish norms for various cost components such as procurement, transportation, and administration. The inefficiencies of producers cannot be passed on to consumers. And conversely, supply of cheap milk to the urban consumers cannot be at the expense of small, rural milk suppliers.
Until an acceptable system becomes operational, the government could provide subsidies on inputs to dairy farmers so that the productivity of their animals and financial returns reach a level where they can recover their full costs from urban consumers without government intervention. The government can show its concern for urban consumers by giving increased subsidies on milk and milk product supplies to specific target groups such as school children, pregnant women, infants, and the poor while allowing the price of milk to move closer to full costs of production. This enables the government to satisfy the poor, urban consumer without unduly penalizing the small milk producer. If the surpluses so generated at unions can be steered towards investments into specialized, large, integrated operations under professional management, we can look forward to a healthier dairy industry and a better rural-urban exchange.
